PacketStation/docs/SECURITY.md

Packet Station security

This document is rewritten for the server build. The old browser build's security document is in the old repo (C:\Users\spencerm\Coding\PacketStation\docs\SECURITY.md). The design comes from BRIEF.md and PLAN.md.

Status: phase 9. The identity controls (sessions, PIN, rate limits, audit, Origin check, derived group map) and the policy controls (server policy on every write, workflow steps as compare-and-set, server-side validation and limits, IT edit reasons, the filed lock, the upload pipeline for drawings and documents) are built and tested. Phase 3 adds the worker controls (read-only VISUAL and M-Files reads, stack guard, advisory locks, redacted errors, audited system writes). No requirement ID closes in phase 3. Phase 4 completes the upload pipeline (a kind per upload with its own types and limit, XLSX and CSV by content, the optional ClamAV scan, the assets volume quota alert) and adds the warehouse rules (the heat gate on release, closed hold and short reasons, receive by custody). Phase 4 closes D5. Phase 5 adds the shop rules (the server as the clock of record, server-assigned mark numbers under the packet row lock, insert-only change-order verifications with a signature, VOID sheets never edited). Phase 6 adds the Q.C. rules (server gates on accept, block sign and sign-off, NCR numbers checked by pattern, Q.C. documents never deleted, the append-only ITP log, server-verified signatures on every Q.C. and ITP sign-off). No requirement ID closes in phase 6. Phase 7 adds the close and file controls (the HMAC seal with the data book filed on it, the controlled-copy and print stamps signed with the seal key, print_log and audit rows for every print and export, the CSV formula guard, PDF metadata, escaping in the PDFs). Phase 7 closes M2, S6, S7 and S8. Phase 8 adds the Project Management reads and exports, the server-side find bar filters and the presence rules (display name and role only, locked and revoked sessions dropped). No requirement ID closes in phase 8. Phase 9 adds the nightly AD reconcile and the 15-minute role refresh, the integrity job with its alert, email notifications over verified STARTTLS with security events nobody can mute, the security alerts and the Security tab settings, the Admin tabs (every change audited), nightly backups with a rehearsed restore, and dependency scanning in CI. Phase 9 closes the app part of I6, M3, O1, O2 and S3. Every other control names the phase that builds it.

Contents:

• Part 1: the 20 old layers and where each one lives now.
• Part 2: the new build's controls.
• Part 3: the production requirement IDs and the phase that closes each.

Part 1: the old layers, moved to the server

The M: drive build had 20 layers of protection, most of them enforced in the browser. Every layer that still applies moves to the server. The rest are dropped or replaced.

#	Old layer	Now	Phase
1	PESCO network and firewall	Kept. The app runs on docker-1 inside the PESCO network, reached only through Nginx Proxy Manager. It publishes no port. PostgreSQL is on each stack's internal network only.	0
2	Windows folder rights on the M: folder	Dropped. Replaced by database roles: the app role cannot change the schema or update or delete the audit; migrations run as a separate role. Files sit on a volume only the containers see.	0
3	Employee ID + PIN sign-in	Replaced by AD sign-in with the domain password, plus an optional Packet Station PIN checked on the server, for registered shop devices only.	1
4	Department and level screens	A static role-to-screen map in the browser, plus server policy on every request. The browser only decides what to show.	1, 2
5	Per-PC access log	Replaced by the server audit. Each row carries the AD account, session, client IP and user agent. No per-PC browser ids.	1
6	Filing seals and filed-packet lock	HMAC seals computed on the server with a server key. The filed lock is a server policy rule. Built.	2, 7
7	Record integrity check	A worker job every night (seals, asset hashes, missing and orphan files, the audit hash chain) with an email alert. Built.	9
8	Self-hosted libraries	Kept: no CDN. The CSP allows nothing external.	0
9	Output escaping	React escapes output by default. The PDF builders clean and escape every text on the server. Built.	1, 7
10	Central permission policy	Server policy, checked on every write, including writes that do not come from the screens. Built.	2
11	PIN sign-off (electronic signature)	Server-verified signature with the PIN or the domain password, stored with who, when, what, factor and a content hash.	1
12	IT edit reasons	Kept. Admin writes need a reason and are marked as IT edits in the packet history and the audit.	2
13	Screen lock	Server-enforced sessions. The browser reports idle and background state; the server records it and refuses an idle or locked session. Unlock is a step-up check on the server.	1
14	Input and upload validation	On the server: field limits on every write, closed reason sets, uploads typed by content per kind (drawing PDF; MTR and document PDF, PNG or JPEG; BOM XLSX or CSV), a size limit per kind (25 MB, BOM 5 MB), sanitised names, an optional ClamAV scan before anything is stored, and a quota alert on the assets volume. Built.	2, 4
15	Second-admin approval	Superseded. Roles come only from AD groups and the group-to-role map is derived, so there is nothing to grant in the app.	1
16	Security alerts and automatic integrity check	The Admin Security tab (alerts from the audit and the sign-in attempts, the last integrity run), the worker jobs and the Notifications tab (email through app-03). Built.	9
17	Controlled-copy stamp on data books	Applied to server-built PDFs and signed with the seal key. Built, phase 7.	7
18	CSV formula guard	Applied to every server export. Built, phase 7.	7
19	Update lock and stale-version block	Replaced by a build version endpoint. A screen on an older build shows a banner and reloads.	0 (endpoint), 10 (banner)
20	VISUAL helper write guard	Dropped. There is no helper. VisualKit and MFilesKit are read-only by design and connect as read-only accounts.	3

Part 2: the new build's controls

Sessions (phase 1)

• HttpOnly, SameSite=Strict session cookie. The session row on the server decides.
• Password sessions: idle sign-out after 15 minutes, absolute 12 hours. PIN shop sessions: absolute 10 hours, idle 15 minutes. Admin and Clerical sessions wait 60 idle minutes (issue 45). All are settings, and from phase 9 an Admin can change them within bounds on the Security tab (see "Security settings").
• Idle and background lock are reported by the browser and enforced by the server. Unlock is a step-up check with the PIN or the domain password.
• Origin check on every state-changing request: the Origin header (or the Referer origin) must match the request host, and X-Requested-With: PacketStation must be present. Otherwise 403.
• Admin is a password session only. A PIN session cannot open Admin or change Account settings.
• Roles are resolved from AD at sign-in (nested groups through LDAP_MATCHING_RULE_IN_CHAIN), cached on the session, and re-resolved every 15 minutes on the session, by the session-refresh job and by the nightly AD reconcile (see "AD reconcile and role refresh"). A disabled AD account is always refused. A session whose user has lost every role is ended at the next refresh.
• The session cookie token is stored only as an HMAC with the session key. The AD password is used for the bind and discarded.
• The group-to-role map is derived from the department table and the PS- naming convention at startup. No screen edits it, so nobody can promote a group or themselves inside the app.
• The browser reports hidden tabs and idle time; the server records locked_since and refuses a locked session with 423 until a step-up unlock. The server also locks a session itself when no request arrived for the lock interval (3 minutes, as the old build's screen lock; 60 for Admin and Clerical, issue 45), and when a tab stayed hidden for over a minute (the old build's background lock). A reload or an in-app navigation never locks.

PIN (phase 1)

• Optional, per user, set by the user in Account settings after a password sign-in. Setting or changing it needs the domain password in the same request.
• 6 to 12 digits, hashed with Argon2id on the server. Never visible to Admin. Admin can clear a PIN (audited), not set one.
• PIN sign-in uses the employee ID and works only on registered devices. Devices are registered by an Admin or a shop department Supervisor in a password session.
• Five wrong PIN attempts in a row, across sign-in, unlock and signature, disable the PIN. Three wrong attempts at unlock or signature end the session. A guessed PIN never touches AD.
• A PIN sign-in still checks AD with the service account: a disabled account, or one removed from every group, is refused.
• The device cookie is a random token stored as an HMAC; revoking a device ends every PIN session on it.

Rate limits (phase 1)

• Checked before any bind to AD, so the app can never lock a domain account out.
• Defaults: 5 failed password sign-ins per account per 5 minutes, then a 10-minute cooldown. 30 failed attempts per client address per 5 minutes. Successful sign-ins never count.
• The domain's own lockout (20 attempts in 5 minutes) stays the last line. From phase 9 the limits can be changed on the Security tab, and the per-account limit is capped at 15, always under AD's 20.
• The client address comes from X-Forwarded-For only when the request comes from npm_app_1 itself, re-resolved on change. Other containers on npm_default are not trusted.
• A refused attempt answers 429 with Retry-After, is recorded as rate_limited and never counts toward the limits itself.
• Failed sign-ins answer one message for an unknown account, a wrong password and a disabled account, so accounts cannot be enumerated. The audit and signin_attempts keep the real reason.

Policy (phase 2)

• One policy in Python on the server (server/packetstation/policy/), pure functions with no I/O. Every write goes: session, policy, transition, validation, version check, packet log row, audit row, NOTIFY, in one transaction with the packet row locked. Nothing in the browser decides.
• Every packet read returns can: [...], blocked: {...} and holder, so the browser enables controls from the server's answer. The server re-checks on the write.
• A workflow step taken twice is refused with 409 and the current state (compare-and-set on the expected status and department). Child rows carry a row version checked with If-Match. Weld, heat tag, page and change order numbers are assigned by the server under the lock.
• Preconditions (heat map answered, drawing attached, BOM pulled or short, heats recorded on pulled lines, checklist complete, welds recorded, Q.C. items complete, closed in VISUAL before filing) run on the server and are never bypassed, Admin included.
• Admin edits outside custody need an IT reason of at least 8 characters, recorded in the packet log and the audit row (it_reason). An Admin cannot write a filed packet except through the reopen action, which needs a reason and a signature and breaks the seal.
• Signatures (PIN or domain password, verified in the same transaction; the PIN is enough everywhere, Q.C. accept and filing included, confirmed by SethD on 2026-10-26, Gitea issue 2) on submit, send to Q.C., Q.C. accept and reject, route, file, reopen, change order issue, approve, reject and verify, the revision approval and hand drawing uploads.
• Input: every string is cleaned (control and invisible characters removed, NFC, trimmed) and cut to its field limit; heat numbers, stamps, project numbers and lots are checked against the old patterns; JSON bodies over 200 KB are refused.
• Uploads: typed by content (PDF, PNG, JPEG), 25 MB limit read in chunks, sha256, stored by id under the assets volume, served only with a session and with Content-Disposition and X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff. Phase 4 completes it (see "Uploads and storage").
• The filed lock: a filed packet accepts only the data book date and the Admin reopen. Filing writes an HMAC-SHA256 seal with the server seal key; a reopen keeps the old seal with who broke it and why.
• Details in POLICY.md.

Uploads and storage (phase 4)

• Every upload names a kind (purpose): drawing, mtr, document or bom. No purpose means document. An unknown kind is 422.
• The type is read from the content, never from the file name or the browser's type. A drawing is a PDF. An MTR or a document is a PDF, PNG or JPEG. A BOM is an XLSX or a CSV. A wrong type for the kind is 415 unsupported_type with a message that names the allowed types.
• An XLSX must be a zip that lists [Content_Types].xml and xl/workbook.xml; a plain zip is refused. A CSV has no magic, so it is accepted only as a BOM, and only when its first 64 KB decode as UTF-8 with no NUL and no control character other than tab, CR and LF.
• Limits per kind: 25 MB (upload_max_bytes) for drawing, mtr and document, 5 MB (upload_max_bytes_bom) for a BOM. The Content-Length is checked first, then the bytes as they are read. Over the limit is 413 too_large.
• XLSX and CSV are always served as an attachment, never inline. Every blob keeps Content-Disposition and nosniff.
• Optional ClamAV (requirement D5). When CLAMAV_HOST is set, every upload and every file the worker stores (drawings from M-Files) is streamed to clamd with zINSTREAM after it is read in full and before it is deduped or placed. A hit is 422 infected, nothing is stored, and an asset.rejected audit row keeps the signature, size and type. A scanner that cannot be reached refuses the upload with 503 scan_unavailable (fail closed). With CLAMAV_HOST empty there is no scan. IT decided on 2026-10-18 (Gitea issue 19) to leave the scan off in both stacks: every workstation that uploads runs Microsoft Defender. Drawings the worker fetches from M-Files are not scanned on the way in. They come from PESCO's own vault.
• Quota alert. After every stored file and in the housekeeping job, the assets volume usage is checked against ASSETS_QUOTA_WARN_PCT (85 by default). Over it, one open notification_events row of kind assets_quota is written and audited as storage.quota_warning. Back under, the row is resolved. A failed check never fails an upload. Admin sees usage, the alert and the scanner on the Storage tab and can acknowledge an alert (alert.acknowledged). From phase 9 the alert and its "Cleared" notice are mailed through the assets_quota rule, to PS-Admins by default (Gitea issue 20).

Warehouse rules (phase 4)

• Release to the supervisor is refused on the server until every line is pulled or short and every pulled line that issued pieces has a heat (N/A and sub-assembly lines excepted). Heat numbers are checked against the old pattern.
• Hold reasons and short reasons are closed sets on the server.
• Short receipts go to the warehouse in any status but filed, or to the holder of the packet through the BOM edit rule. Nobody else.
• An MTR on a line must be a PDF, PNG or JPEG asset.

Shop rules (phase 5)

• The server is the clock of record. The station clock is kept in packet_stages with the database time. Only the server writes the clock columns. No request field sets the elapsed time.
• Weld and heat tag numbers (W<n>, H<n>) are assigned by the server from the packet counters, under the packet row lock. Two people marking at once never get the same number.
• ASSIGN checks on the server that the welder belongs to the department and that a limited worker's station is one of theirs.
• A change-order verification needs a signature and is insert-only. A second one for the same department is refused. It cannot be withdrawn.
• VOID sheets are never edited. A voided page is kept, and new marks or moves on it are refused (422 void_page).
• A borrowed heat map is read-only. Nothing on the sibling packet can be written through the borrowing packet.
• Presence over SSE carries display names, never other personal data. Each entry is the user id, display name, screen and packet id. Phase 8 adds the role and since (see "Project Management, find bar and presence").

Q.C. rules (phase 6)

• Accept is refused on the server until the Q.C. record is complete (qc_missing_empty: every check item, a visual result on every weld and none rejected, an acceptable NDE result when a method is set, the inspector name). The screen only shows the reason.
• A block signature is refused until every line of the block is initialed or N/A. The sign-off is refused until every block is signed. Both are server rules. A signed-off ITP refuses every write but the reopen, which needs a Q.C. Supervisor, or an admin with an IT reason, and a reason.
• An ITP line rejected without an NCR number cannot be approved (server check). Line initials and block signatures can be removed only by the person who made them, or an admin.
• NCR numbers are checked against the pattern NCR-YYYY-NNNN on the server. Checking them against pesco-ncr is reserved for a later phase (domain/ncr.py, validate_ncr). The NCR link opens in a new tab with rel="noopener noreferrer".
• Documents are never deleted. A packet document is taken out of the data book with a reason and the row is kept. A Q.C. folder document is replaced by a new revision; the old row stays and points at the new one. Packet document kinds and Q.C. document types are closed sets, checked on the server and by database CHECKs. Every document file is a PDF, PNG or JPEG, typed by content.
• itp_log is append-only, like packet_log: the app role has SELECT and INSERT only, and a trigger refuses updates, deletes and truncate. itp_rejects stays append-only, so every reject and its NCR number survive a later approval.
• Signatures verified on the server, with a content hash: Q.C. accept, Q.C. accept and route, Q.C. reject, the ITP block signature and the ITP sign-off.
• The ITP and the Q.C. folder are checked with check_scoped(): the same system, admin bypass, who and precondition steps as a packet write. An admin outside Q.C. and Clerical needs an IT reason, recorded in itp_log and the audit row.
• Every ITP write and every Q.C. folder document writes an audit row (itp.<action>, qc_doc.add, qc_doc.revise).

Worker (phase 3)

• The worker publishes no port and joins no proxy network. It reaches out to VISUAL and M-Files only; nothing reaches in. Admin and Clerical reach it only through rows in PostgreSQL (job_requests, the feed settings row) and NOTIFY.
• It reads VISUAL through VisualKit as visualkit_ro and M-Files through MFilesKit as mfileskitRO. Both libraries are read-only in their own code. Nothing in Packet Station writes to either.
• Stack guard at start and again before every feed run: the test stack refuses a production VISUAL target, production refuses an implicit one, and production refuses a fixture source.
• One run per job at a time, by a PostgreSQL advisory lock per job name. Feed writes run in one transaction with a lock timeout and skip rows a person has locked.
• Job errors are redacted (connection strings, password=, Authorization: and the VISUAL and M-Files passwords themselves) and cut to 20 entries of 500 characters before they are stored or shown.
• Every feed write goes through the server policy as the system principal, which can take only the vis_* actions. Each one writes a packet log row and an audit row with role system. Each run writes a feed.run audit row with its counts, and each drawing fetch a drawing.fetched row with the sha256. Feed settings and resource map changes are audited with before and after.
• Downloaded drawings go through the same checks as uploads: PDF magic, size limit, streamed sha256, stored by id.

Audit (phase 1)

• Append-only audit_events, with a hash chain (prev_hash, row_hash).
• The app role may insert and select, never update or delete. A trigger also refuses updates and deletes. Migrations run as a separate role.
• packetstation doctor checks that an audit UPDATE fails.
• Every identity event is a row: sign-in, failed sign-in with a reason, sign-out, lock, unlock, session ended, PIN set, disabled or cleared, device registered or revoked, signature, AD refresh. Phase 9 adds auth.lockout, auth.signin_burst, policy.denied, auth.session_ended with by for sessions the reconcile and role refresh end, and the admin.* rows for every Admin change. Each carries the user, session, roles, client address and a small detail object, never a secret.
• signin_attempts and signatures are append-only in the same way.
• Phase 4 audit actions: asset.rejected (an upload the virus scan refused, with reason, signature, size and mime), storage.quota_warning (the assets volume went over the warning threshold, with the usage) and alert.acknowledged (an Admin acknowledged an open alert). Every warehouse write is a packet.<action> row with detail.item, the warehouse stage before and after, and detail.qty on short writes.

CI identity fixtures (phase 1)

• CI runs a throwaway Samba Active Directory domain controller (PSTEST.LOCAL) built from deploy/samba/, with a generated CA so the LDAPS path is real. It is seeded with the 50 groups (one missing and one extra on purpose) and test users for every role, including nested, disabled, multi-role, missing and duplicate employee ID cases. Passwords are random per run and exported to a volume the tests read. PESCO's AD is never used by CI.

Seals (phase 7)

• Filing writes an HMAC-SHA256 seal over the packet's read model in seal mode, with the server seal key (SEAL_KEY_FILE, a Docker secret) and its key_id. Nobody without the key can recompute it (M2). GET /api/packets/{id}/seal rebuilds the content and says whether the seal still matches.
• The data book is built on the server inside the filing transaction and stored as an asset on the seal. A data book that cannot be built fails the filing; nothing is filed half way.
• Filing while the feed shows a work order open in VISUAL needs a second confirmation. The work orders are kept on the seal and in the packet log.
• A reopen by Admin needs a reason and a signature. It marks the seal broken with who, when and why, and keeps the row and its data book. Filing again writes a new seal beside it.
• The integrity job re-verifies every seal of a filed packet every night (see "Integrity job").

PDFs, prints and exports (phase 7)

• Every PDF and the CSV are built on the server. The browser only opens the URL. Reads need a signed-in session; every role that can open the packet may read them, PM included.
• Controlled-copy stamp (S7): every exported page carries Controlled copy - exported by Name (emp) <UTC time>, the seal's first 12 hex or not yet filed, and - stamp <sig>. The filed data book is the stored copy, served as it was built.
• Printed-copy stamp (S8): every printed page carries PRINTED COPY - <what> - printed by Name (emp) <UTC time> - <project> Lot <unit> dwg <drawing> R<rev> - verify revision before use and the stamp signature, in a white box at the bottom of the page.
• Stamp signature: 16 hex of HMAC-SHA256 with the seal key over the packet, the kind (a printed copy signs print:<kind>, so a print and an export of the same thing in the same minute never share a signature), the seal hash, the user and the time. A copy can be checked against the server with verify_stamp; from phase 9 the Admin Stamp check tab does it from a pasted line or a PDF.
• Logging (S7, S8): every print and export writes one print_log row (who, when, session, packet, unit or ITP, kind, what, pages, the stamp line, the stamp signature, the client address) and one audit row (print or export). print_log is append-only: the app role has SELECT and INSERT only, and a trigger refuses updates, deletes and truncate.
• CSV formula guard (S6): a cell that starts with =, +, -, @, a tab or a CR gets a leading '. A cell with a quote, a comma or a line break is quoted with the quotes doubled.
• PDF metadata: title, subject and keywords name the packet and the stamp signature; Author is PESCO and Producer is Packet Station.
• Output escaping (S5): every text drawn into a PDF goes through clean (control characters removed, characters outside Latin-1 replaced) and is XML-escaped where a Paragraph renders it, so data from VISUAL, M-Files or a person cannot inject markup.
• Responses carry Content-Disposition (inline, or attachment with ?download=1), X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff and Cache-Control: no-store. A print of a document checks that the asset belongs to the packet, its unit or project folder, or its filed data book; anything else is 404.
• The signed ITP PDF is built and filed in the sign-off transaction. A PDF that cannot be built fails the sign-off.

Project Management, find bar and presence (phase 8)

• Project Management reads only. Every endpoint under /api/pm is a GET and needs a signed-in session. Any role may read them, as any role may open any packet. The PM role passes no write action anywhere. The reports read PostgreSQL only, never VISUAL or M-Files.
• Every PM export is built on the server and logged: one print_log row (kind report-csv or report-pdf, no packet, the scope label in what, the page count for the PDF) and one audit row with the action report exported and the detail {name, format, scope, period}. print_log stays append-only.
• The PM CSV has the formula guard on every cell (S6), a BOM and CRLF line ends. The PDF report carries the controlled-copy stamp on every page and the PDF metadata. Both answer with Content-Disposition, nosniff and no-store, as the phase 7 exports do.
• Filters never widen access. The search, the status, flag, station, worker and Mine filters are applied by the server inside each list's and board's own scope (a supervisor's departments, the stall's station). A filter can only narrow what the person may already read.
• Search words are bound parameters, matched with ILIKE and the LIKE escape. A query keeps at most 8 words of at most 60 characters each. IDs are matched as text, never cast.
• Mine is decided on the server from the person's AD roles and the screen they name. Nothing the browser keeps can widen it.
• Presence shows the display name and the role only (the user id, screen, packet id and since travel with it). No employee ID, no email, no other personal data. The server builds it from the session, not from what the browser says about itself.
• A locked session drops out of presence at once, and comes back on unlock. A revoked session drops out at once and its stream ends. A closed tab drops out when the stream ends, within the 25-second ping cycle.
• Saved filters live in the browser's localStorage (ps.flt, ps.proj, ps.pmtab, ps.pmper, ps.motion). They hold filter choices only. The search text is never saved. Nothing in them is trusted by the server.

AD reconcile and role refresh (phase 9)

• ad-reconcile runs every night at 01:30 site time, and when an Admin presses "Refresh from AD now" (a job request; the button answers 202 at once). It lists the PacketStation OU, reports mapped groups missing from it and extra groups in it, reads every mapped group's members through LDAP_MATCHING_RULE_IN_CHAIN (nested) in pages of 500, and upserts users on their objectGUID. AD is read first, then everything is written in one transaction.
• A user disabled in AD, or gone from AD, is marked inactive and every session they have is ended (ad_disabled, ad_gone). A user still in AD but in no mapped group loses their roles and their sessions (roles_lost). Each ended session writes an auth.session_ended audit row with the reason and by: ad-reconcile.
• Missing and duplicate employee IDs are flagged on the user (directory_flags) and listed on the Admin Profiles tab. A PIN sign-in by a duplicate employee ID is refused, as in phase 1.
• Safety guard: the reconcile refuses and changes nothing when no mapped group is found in the OU (a wrong LDAP_GROUP_BASE_DN) or when every mapped group is empty while active users exist (PLAN.md open question 44). AD unreachable fails the run and changes nothing.
• session-refresh runs every 15 minutes (the roles_refresh_minutes setting, 5 to 60). For every user with a live session it reads the account by objectGUID and its groups again, rebuilds the roles and each session's role snapshot, and ends the sessions of anyone disabled, gone or left with no role. AD unreachable makes the run degraded and ends nothing.
• A request still re-reads the roles when its session's snapshot is older than the refresh interval, as in phase 1. Between the two, a person removed from a group loses the role within 15 minutes, and a person disabled in AD is signed out within 15 minutes.
• Together these close the app's part of I6 (joiner, mover, leaver). The quarterly access review stays IT's.

Integrity job (phase 9)

• integrity runs every night at 04:00 site time. It re-verifies every unbroken seal of a filed packet with the seal key (a seal under another key id is a finding), rehashes asset files (uploads of the last 7 days every night, every asset on Sundays) and records hash_checked_at and hash_ok, finds asset rows with no file and files under the assets volume with no asset row (older than an hour; reported, never deleted), and walks the audit hash chain.
• Each finding is a row in the append-only integrity_findings (at most 500 per kind per run, the full count in the run). Any finding raises the integrity_failure alert, a security event that nobody can opt out of. A clean run clears it with a "Cleared" message. The Admin Security tab shows the last run and its findings.
• A missing seal key makes the run degraded and leaves the seals unchecked, never "clean".
• This closes M3 (tamper detection on records, files and the audit).

Notifications (phase 9)

• Mail goes through SMTP_HOST (app-03.pesco.com, port 25) with STARTTLS, verified against SMTP_CA_BUNDLE (the PESCO CA). There is no plain-text fallback: a relay without STARTTLS, a TLS error or a wrong certificate fails the message, and the failure is recorded. There is no SMTP login.
• Each message is addressed To SMTP_FROM ([email protected]). The recipients are in the envelope only, so nobody sees the list.
• Recipients are resolved when the message goes. Group members must be enabled accounts with a mail address. An inactive user gets nothing. Every message writes one append-only notifications_sent row with each address, the user and why it was chosen.
• Bodies are plain text from the server. No link carries a token or a session. Raising an event never fails the action that raised it.
• The test stack runs with NOTIFY_DRY_RUN=true: messages are recorded as dry_run and not sent. A test send from the Admin tab always sends. Subjects start [Packet Station] on production and [Packet Station TEST] on any other stack.
• The security event types (security_alert, signin_burst, integrity_failure) cannot be opted out of on Account settings, and an Admin cannot exclude anyone from them.

Security alerts (phase 9)

The Admin Security tab lists, for the last 24 hours by default (up to 168):

Kind	From
Account cooldowns (lockout)	auth.lockout audit rows, written when an account goes over its failure limit
Wrong PINs (pin_failures)	Three or more wrong PINs for one person in the window, at any step
Wrong unlock or signature (stepup_wrong_pin)	A wrong PIN or password at unlock or at a signature
Denied actions (denied)	policy.denied audit rows: any 403 after the person was known (method, path and code; never a body)
Sign-in bursts (signin_burst)	auth.signin_burst audit rows: an address over its limit, or failed sign-ins across accounts in 5 minutes at or over the burst threshold
Admin changes (admin_change)	admin.* audit rows
IT edits (it_edit)	Audit rows with an IT reason
Integrity (integrity)	integrity_findings rows

Account cooldowns, a PIN disabled, a session ended after wrong PINs and sign-in bursts are also mailed (security_alert, signin_burst).

Security settings (phase 9)

The Admin Security tab overrides these environment defaults, stored in the security settings row with compare and set, audited with before and after. A value out of bounds is refused; a stored value out of bounds is ignored and the default applies. The app reads them per request, cached for at most 30 seconds.

Setting	Default	Bounds
session_lock_minutes (lock after idle)	3	1 to 30
session_idle_minutes (sign out after idle)	15	1 to 60
session_desk_minutes (Admin and Clerical idle)	60	5 to 240
session_password_hours	12	1 to 24
session_pin_hours	10	1 to 24
roles_refresh_minutes	15	5 to 60
signin_account_limit (failed sign-ins per account before a cooldown)	5	1 to 15
signin_account_window_minutes	5	1 to 60
signin_account_cooldown_minutes	10	0 to 120
signin_ip_limit (failures per address)	30	5 to 200
signin_ip_window_minutes	5	1 to 60
signin_burst_threshold (failures across accounts in 5 minutes that raise an alert)	20	5 to 200

The account limit is capped at 15 so the app always stops before AD's own lockout at 20 attempts in 5 minutes. The PIN limit (5) and the step-up limit (3) stay environment settings.

Admin (phase 9)

• Every Admin endpoint needs PS-Admins in a password session. Every Admin change is audited with before and after. Tests try every endpoint as every role.
• Roles still come only from AD. The Admin edits departments (name, stations), profiles (stamp, profile active, station limits), checklists, the security settings and the notification rules. None of these grants a role. Turning a profile off hides the person from pickers and changes no right.
• Department codes and short names never change (a trigger, and 422 on the API). Stations are never deleted.
• The access log CSV has the formula guard, at most 50,000 rows, and is logged in print_log and the audit.
• The stamp check recomputes the stamp signature with the seal key and compares the text with the print log (S7, S8). It reads a pasted line or a PDF of up to 25 MB.

Backups (phase 9)

• scripts/backup/ps-backup.sh runs as root from a systemd timer at 02:00 Denver time, an hour before the Proxmox Backup Server run of the whole VM. It dumps each stack with pg_dump -Fc inside the postgres container over the local socket (no password read or passed), checks each dump with pg_restore --list, keeps 7, and writes last-success or last-failure.
• The roles are dumped with --no-role-passwords. A password hash in a file is an offline cracking target, and the file lands in PBS. The restore script refuses a globals file that holds a password hash. The role passwords stay in the stack secrets.
• Dumps and globals are mode 0600. The production folder is root:10001 0750, so only root and the worker (read-only mount) see it.
• The worker's backup-check job raises backup_stale when the newest dump is missing, empty, older than 26 hours, or followed by a failure.
• The restore was rehearsed on the test stack on 2026-10-21 into a separate database: every table's row count matched and all 189 asset files matched their recorded sha256 (DEPLOY.md, "Restore rehearsal 2026-10-21"). This closes O1 and O2 for the first rehearsal. The quarterly restore test is IT's.

Dependency scanning (phase 9)

• Every CI run scans the dependencies. pip-audit (pinned, in its own virtual environment) checks every pin in server/requirements.txt without resolving and fails on any known vulnerability, which is stricter than high or critical. npm audit --audit-level=high fails on a high or critical finding in the frontend, dev dependencies included.
• visualkit and mfileskit come from PESCO's own index and are not audited. Their dependencies that we install are pinned in requirements.txt and are.
• No finding is ignored. If one ever has no fix, the way out is --ignore-vuln <ID> with a comment and a date.
• The first scan (2026-10-21) found pypdf 6.21.0 (GHSA-5hx5-vpf9-5wcv) and certifi 2026.7.22 (PYSEC-2026-4320). Both were bumped. This closes S3.

Headers (phase 0)

• The app sets HSTS, CSP and the other security headers itself. NPM's own HSTS is off.
• The CSP allows nothing external. It is tuned again in phase 10.

Secrets (phase 0)

• Docker secrets only. Production: files under /etc/packetstation/prod/secrets, owner root:10001, mode 0440. Test: files under /home/spencerm/packetstation/test/secrets, mode 0444, behind two 0750 folders owned by spencerm (Gitea issue 38).
• Read through *_PASSWORD_FILE settings. MFilesKit's password is exported by the entrypoint from its secret file.
• Never in the repo, .env, logs or chat. See DEPLOY.md.

Part 3: requirement IDs

The IDs come from Part 3 of the old SECURITY.md. The status follows the approved plan.

ID	Status
H1, H2	Closed, phase 0 (docker-1, internal DNS, NPM)
H3	Closed, phase 0 (NPM TLS, HSTS from the app)
H4	Closed, phase 0 (two stacks)
H5	IT's (host patching); documented in DEPLOY.md
I1	Partly closed, phase 1 (AD sign-in, no SSO); Entra SSO deferred
I2	Deferred (MFA with Entra)
I3	Closed for "PIN on the server", phase 1; device certificate deferred
I4	Closed, phase 1
I5	Superseded (no in-app admin grant); separate IT admin accounts remain IT's
I6	App part closed, phase 9 (roles only from AD groups; the nightly ad-reconcile marks disabled and gone users inactive, ends their sessions and flags employee ID problems; session-refresh re-reads every live session's groups and account state every 15 minutes and ends the sessions of anyone disabled, gone or left with no role); quarterly access review IT's
I7	Closed, phase 1
I8	App part closed, phase 1; kiosk lock policy IT's (Intune or GPO)
A1, A2, A3	Closed, phase 2 (server policy on every call, workflow steps as compare-and-set, validation and limits on the server)
A4	Closed, phase 0
D1, D2, D4	Deferred (envelope encryption, Key Vault)
D3	IT's (host disk encryption on docker-1)
D5	Closed, phase 4 (optional ClamAV: a clamav compose profile; when CLAMAV_HOST is set every upload and every stored drawing is scanned before it is kept, a hit is refused and audited, and an unreachable scanner refuses uploads; off when the host is not set; left off in both stacks by IT on 2026-10-18, Gitea issue 19, with Microsoft Defender on the workstations)
D6, D7	Deferred (retention period and customer copy need a decision from Seth and Q.C.)
M1	Closed, phase 2 (append-only audit and packet log written only by the server; every packet write carries both)
M2	Closed, phase 7 (filing seal is HMAC-SHA256 with the server seal key from a Docker secret; a reopen keeps the broken seal and its data book)
M3	Closed, phase 9 (the nightly integrity job re-verifies seals, rehashes asset files, finds missing and orphan files and walks the audit hash chain; findings are kept in the append-only integrity_findings and raise integrity_failure, which nobody can opt out of)
M4, M5	Deferred (logs to stdout now; SIEM shipping is IT's)
S1	Closed, phase 0, tuned phase 10
S2	Closed, phase 1
S3	Closed, phase 9 (CI scanning on every run: pip-audit over every pin in server/requirements.txt fails on any known vulnerability; npm audit --audit-level=high fails on a high or critical one; the first scan bumped pypdf and certifi)
S4	Deferred to IT (pentest before go-live)
S5	Closed, phase 2 (React escapes output; server messages are plain text); phase 7 adds escaping in the PDF builders
S6	Closed, phase 7 (the CSV formula guard on every export)
S7	Closed, phase 7 (the controlled-copy stamp on every exported PDF, signed with the seal key; PDF metadata; every export logged in print_log and the audit)
S8	Closed, phase 7 (the PRINTED COPY stamp with "verify revision before use" on every printed page, signed with the seal key; every print logged in print_log and the audit). PLAN.md lists S8 under phase 5, but the print stamps come with the PDFs in phase 7, so S8 closes there.
O1, O2	Closed, phase 9 (nightly pg_dump of each stack at 02:00 Denver time from a systemd timer, checked with pg_restore --list, 7 kept, before the 03:00 PBS run of the VM; the backup-check job alerts on a missing, empty, stale or failed backup; restore rehearsed on the test stack on 2026-10-21 with every row count and asset hash matching); quarterly restore test IT's
O3, O4	Closed, phase 10
O5	Superseded (no migration; M: retired read-only)

The brief's wording for the identity IDs, which the table above follows:

• I4 and I7 (PIN lockout, PIN signatures verified on the server) are closed by this build.
• I8 is closed for the app's part. The kiosk device lock policy in I8 is IT's, via Intune or GPO.
• I6 (joiner, mover, leaver) is closed for the app's part by the AD groups, the nightly reconcile and the 15-minute role refresh. The quarterly access review is still IT's.
• I3 is closed for "PIN checked on the server" and open for "Intune-managed, device certificate". Registered devices use a device cookie for now.
• I1 is partly closed by AD sign-in. There is no SSO yet.
• I5 is superseded. No in-app admin grant exists, so second-admin approval has nothing to approve. Separate IT admin accounts with MFA remain IT's.

Out of scope for this build, with hooks left: writing to VISUAL or M-Files (never), Entra ID sign-in and MFA (I1, I2), envelope encryption with Key Vault (D1, D2), true .xlsx exports, scheduled report emails.