Phase 3: VISUAL feed and M-Files drawings in the worker
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Migration 0004 (VISUAL and drawing caches, go-live ignored list, resource
map, job tables, order-derived columns with provenance; work order key
includes the operation sequence). The real worker on APScheduler with
settings re-read each fire, pause, run now, advisory locks, job_runs and a
heartbeat. The visual-feed job (five VisualKit reads, COPY and MERGE cache,
suspect-batch guard, the apply in one transaction: drafts, change orders,
retire-moved, work order gone, closed and cancelled observed, projects and
units from order links, auto-release) and the fingerprint. The drawing-lookup
job (queue, budget, download on version change, sha256 into assets, decision
table, staging for rev approval, drawing-origin change orders). Clerical From
VISUAL panel, flags, rev approval, hand uploads, change-order review; Admin
Feed settings and resource map. Synthetic fixture generator and a
fixture-driven worker in CI with a Playwright scenario. Docs updated.

Verified: 3249 server tests and 13 Playwright scenarios on the docker-1 CI
stack, 76 frontend tests, doctor at 0004; one feed and one drawing run
against VISUAL DEV and the vault from the developer machine (counts in the
changelog).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <[email protected]>
This commit is contained in:
2026-10-16 14:45:38 -06:00
co-authored by Claude Fable 5.1
parent 16950055e3
commit 591fe90076
103 changed files with 16063 additions and 151 deletions
+11 -1
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This document is rewritten for the server build. The old browser build's security document is in the old repo (`C:\Users\spencerm\Coding\PacketStation\docs\SECURITY.md`). The design comes from [BRIEF.md](BRIEF.md) and [PLAN.md](PLAN.md).
Status: phase 2. The identity controls (sessions, PIN, rate limits, audit, Origin check, derived group map) and the policy controls (server policy on every write, workflow steps as compare-and-set, server-side validation and limits, IT edit reasons, the filed lock, the upload pipeline for drawings and documents) are built and tested. Every other control names the phase that builds it.
Status: phase 3. The identity controls (sessions, PIN, rate limits, audit, Origin check, derived group map) and the policy controls (server policy on every write, workflow steps as compare-and-set, server-side validation and limits, IT edit reasons, the filed lock, the upload pipeline for drawings and documents) are built and tested. Phase 3 adds the worker controls (read-only VISUAL and M-Files reads, stack guard, advisory locks, redacted errors, audited system writes). No requirement ID closes in phase 3. Every other control names the phase that builds it.
Contents:
@@ -82,6 +82,16 @@ The M: drive build had 20 layers of protection, most of them enforced in the bro
- The filed lock: a filed packet accepts only the data book date and the Admin reopen. Filing writes an HMAC-SHA256 seal with the server seal key; a reopen keeps the old seal with who broke it and why.
- Details in [POLICY.md](POLICY.md).
### Worker (phase 3)
- The worker publishes no port and joins no proxy network. It reaches out to VISUAL and M-Files only; nothing reaches in. Admin and Clerical reach it only through rows in PostgreSQL (`job_requests`, the `feed` settings row) and NOTIFY.
- It reads VISUAL through VisualKit as `visualkit_ro` and M-Files through MFilesKit as `mfileskitRO`. Both libraries are read-only in their own code. Nothing in Packet Station writes to either.
- Stack guard at start and again before every feed run: the test stack refuses a production VISUAL target, production refuses an implicit one, and production refuses a fixture source.
- One run per job at a time, by a PostgreSQL advisory lock per job name. Feed writes run in one transaction with a lock timeout and skip rows a person has locked.
- Job errors are redacted (connection strings, `password=`, `Authorization:` and the VISUAL and M-Files passwords themselves) and cut to 20 entries of 500 characters before they are stored or shown.
- Every feed write goes through the server policy as the system principal, which can take only the `vis_*` actions. Each one writes a packet log row and an audit row with role `system`. Each run writes a `feed.run` audit row with its counts, and each drawing fetch a `drawing.fetched` row with the sha256. Feed settings and resource map changes are audited with before and after.
- Downloaded drawings go through the same checks as uploads: PDF magic, size limit, streamed sha256, stored by id.
### Audit (phase 1)
- Append-only `audit_events`, with a hash chain (`prev_hash`, `row_hash`).