Gitea Actions runner for docker-1 (deploy/runner), DEPLOY.md and PLAN.md notes
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Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <[email protected]>
This commit is contained in:
2026-10-16 10:05:40 -06:00
co-authored by Claude Fable 5.1
parent 37d9a0cb50
commit 0df0ea62e9
6 changed files with 136 additions and 1 deletions
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@@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ Smaller questions from the design, with the default the build takes unless told
12. Partspecs, title or folded-operation target changes on an in-shop packet: default no change order, as the old build.
13. Work-order-gone confirmation after 2 consecutive runs and the 10% suspect-batch guard: defaults as stated.
14. Pause scope: default pauses the feed, the drawing job and auto-release together.
15. Gitea runner: whether the Samba DC container can run there (overlayfs xattrs, possibly cap SYS_ADMIN). Checked in phase 1; if not, CI uses a runner with a Docker socket on docker-1. Phase 1 finding (2026-10-16): the container needs `cap_add: [SYS_ADMIN]` (Samba 4.17 sets sysvol NT ACLs through `security.*` xattrs) and runs that way on docker-1; the Gitea runner itself is still to be tried.
15. Gitea runner: whether the Samba DC container can run there (overlayfs xattrs, possibly cap SYS_ADMIN). Checked in phase 1; if not, CI uses a runner with a Docker socket on docker-1. Phase 1 finding (2026-10-16): the container needs `cap_add: [SYS_ADMIN]` (Samba 4.17 sets sysvol NT ACLs through `security.*` xattrs) and runs that way on docker-1; the Gitea runner itself is still to be tried. Phase 2 (2026-10-16): an act_runner with the host Docker socket is registered on docker-1 as `docker-1` (deploy/runner/); the first workflow run, after the repository is pushed to Gitea, shows whether its Docker proxy passes `cap_add` to the DC.
16. NPM: confirm `Block common exploits` does not interfere with uploads; checked when the test proxy host is made in phase 0.
17. SET_DATABOOK_AT is writable by anyone in the old build, even when filed: default restrict to Clerical and Q.C.
18. CO verifications cannot be withdrawn; ITP line signatures can be undone by the same inspector or an Admin before the block is signed.